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Abstract: 
Our article aims at testing whether French female researchers face a glass ceiling, an invisible barrier 
to promotion. Using an original database from the National Institute for Agricultural Research, we 
estimate duration models of promotions. This methodology allows us to take into account censored 
observations and unobserved heterogeneity. Our results exhibit a significant gender effect, which does 
not contradict the glass ceiling hypothesis. Moreover, gender does not have a uniform effect. It 
interacts with other variables so that there exist factors that accelerate promotion, while others tend to 
slow it down. 
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I- Introduction
Whatever the profession (Albrecht, et al., 2003; Joy, 1998; Spurr and Sueyoshi, 
1994), the literature provides a large amount of evidence on the under-
representation of women in senior positions. This suggests that women face a 
glass ceiling, which limits their promotion. Although academia attracts more and 
more women, Benjamin (1999) notes that this sector does not seem to escape the 
glass ceiling phenomenon. The ETAN Report (2000) states that, in all OECD 
countries, the proportion of females decreases further up the rank ladder. On 
average, three times more women and twice as many women are founded in the 
"assistant" (30.5% of women) and "lecturer" positions (20.5% of women) than in 
the "full professor" grade (10.4%).  
 These statistics seem then to be consistent with the presence of a glass ceiling. 
But, observed gender differences among academics could be caused by gender 
disparities in different activities. For example, Schneider (1998) notes that women 
are found more in pedagogical activities. This could explain why they tend to 
publish less and why they are less likely to be promoted. So, in order to establish 
the existence of a glass ceiling in academia, other factors that affect careers must 
be taken into account. Only an econometric analysis will allow this ceteris paribus 
analysis.  
However, microeconometric studies are relatively scarce and most of them have 
focused on wages. On the basis of Mincer equations, studies generally find 
significant wage gaps between men and women, even after controlling for 
individual characteristics, publication scores, department characteristics and so 
forth. Using American data from the Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR), 
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3
Ginther and Hayes (1999) calculate the gender gap to be 9% in Human Sciences 
for men. For Ward (2001), women in Scottish academia earn 26% less than their 
male counterparts. Although these results do not refute the glass ceiling 
hypothesis, cracks do appear. First, the gender wage gap has decreased since the 
1970's (Ransom and Megdal, 1993).  Second, estimated wage gaps are mainly 
caused by gender differences in observable heterogeneity. Using the Oaxaca 
decomposition, Ward (2001) shows that only three percentage points of the 26% 
estimated can be attributed to discrimination. Ginther and Hayes (2003) confirm 
this result and demonstrate that gender rank differentials mainly explain gender 
wage gaps. This suggests that wages follow the rank ladder. 
 
Since then, the literature has focused on the promotion process. Ginther and 
Hayes (2003) estimate the promotion probability using univariate probit models. 
They conclude that women in Human Sciences are significantly less likely to be 
promoted to tenured positions, ceteris paribus: the estimated gap is about 8%. 
Mixon and Trevino (2005) confirm the female discrimination for economists in the 
US South. This result remains true when the dynamic process of promotion is 
taken into account. Using a random-effects probit model, Mc Dowell et al. (1999) 
conclude that the "average women" is 36% less likely to be promoted to the 
"assistant professor" rank and 9% less likely to be promoted to the "full professor" 
rank. In the same way, Kahn (1993) finds that, in Economics, risk ratios for 
women to become tenured are about two-third of the male rate. Ginther and 
Hayes (2003) find similar results in Humanities. The estimated gender gap in 
promotion rates is large: women are 25% less likely to be promoted, ceteris paribus.
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Finally, the empirical literature does not refute the hypothesis that women are 
less likely to gain access senior position. This seems to illustrate the existence of a 
glass ceiling for academics, whatever the discipline. But, existing results are based 
on American or British data, countries which have very similar academic systems. 
It could be argued that gender gaps result from a particular organization of 
academia which is unfair to females. It would be useful to test the glass ceiling 
hypothesis in another type of organization and the French academic system 
provides an interesting alternative framework. Indeed, French academia has a 
number of specific features that make it quite different from the USA or Great 
Britain (see Ginther (2001) and Euwals and Ward (2000) for a detailed description 
of each academic system).  
First, in contrast to other countries, the academic sector is two-headed and is 
comprised of universities and national research laboratories. Each institution is 
independent and has its own working rules. For example, researchers working in 
one of the national research institutes have no teaching duties, unlike those 
working in universities.  
Second, in the USA or Great Britain, academic careers depend on tenure rules. 
After their PhD., young researchers are hired as assistant professors on a fixed 
term contract. Afterwards, for those who gain access to it, life-long employment 
(as Full Professor) is proposed. Promotion criteria include scientific achievements, 
such as the number of publications and their quality. French academia is 
organised quite differently. The key difference is that the life-time contract begins 
soon after hiring, whatever the institution (universities or national research 
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laboratories) or disciplines. While hiring depends on the quality of research 
performed during the PhD., researchers become tenured civil servants after only 
12 months probation and this occurs almost automatically. Civil servant status 
implies a life-long job and, for a given rank, a fixed wage scale. Two main ranks 
exist in each research institution: assistant professor (or its equivalent in national 
laboratories: the researcher rank) and full professor (or the senior researcher 
rank). For a given status, wages are fixed by a national collective agreement and 
are the same for all universities or research laboratories. Finally, no difference in 
terms of wages for a given level will be observed.  
In France, the objective of seeking promotion is not to get tenure (since this is 
automatic). Higher wages and greater responsibilities (such as being a PhD. 
advisor or managing a team of researchers) motivate researchers or assistant 
professors to become senior researchers or full professors. As in other countries, 
promotion to the senior rank depends on scientific achievements, which are 
examined by promotion committees.  
Another difference is that all disciplines in French academia are organized 
according to this general framework: general hiring and career rules are common. 
As stressed in the stylized facts, if the promotion process is studied, one finds that 
large gender differences exist. This suggests that, in spite of the different 
organization of the academic sector, French female researchers are also under-
represented in senior ranks, and this is a sign of a glass ceiling.  
 
Page 5 of 54
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
6
The aim of this article is to test whether this hypothesis can be refuted or not on 
by studying promotion paths. As in the previous literature, we will take account 
of both observed heterogeneity, such as individual attributes and scientific 
achievements, which can explain promotions gaps and also unobserved 
heterogeneity, which is often neglected. As career paths in French academia can 
only be described by rank evolution, the gender effect is evaluated on the hazard 
of becoming a "Senior Researcher". 
We do face one major difficulty though since, in France, no data set is generally 
available to study academic careers. In section two we explain how we have 
constructed a panel data set for researchers' careers. This data set allows us to 
follow a group of biologists, working at the National Institute for Agricultural 
Research, called INRA, one of the national research institutes in France. Focusing 
both on life scientists in only one institute will enable us to test the glass ceiling 
hypothesis with homogenous data (one discipline in one institute) and to provide 
the first study of this phenomenon for France.  
 
II- The Data
As no dataset exists to describe the career paths of researchers in France, we have 
constructed one, based on administrative files from the National Institute for 
Agricultural Research (INRA). Founded in 1946, this institute aims at developing 
scientific knowledge, particularly in the fields of agriculture, food and the 
environment. In 2002, INRA had 260 research departments and employed about 
1,800 researchers, 37% of whom are female. As in other national laboratories, 
these researchers are grouped in two ranks. The lowest rank comprises 
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Researchers (R) and the higher Senior Researchers (SR), and 35% of the INRA 
researchers are at the senior rank. 
As in other national research institutes, gender parity is nearly established in the 
"Researcher" rank, but, women are under-represented in the senior rank: 5.5% of 
researchers are female senior researchers. Furthermore, at INRA, the situation for 
female researchers is worse than in other public research institutes or universities. 
In Table 1, it can be seen that the share of senior researchers among women is ten 
percentage points lower at INRA than in other public institutes. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
At INRA, the traditional career path is to begin at the Researcher rank and later 
possibly to accede to the Senior rank2. We focus on this particular promotion 
path. Promotion to the "Senior Researcher" rank occurs mainly through an 
internal competitive process. The promotion process is formal: available positions 
are published on INRA's website or in newspapers. Applicants have to submit 
their CV, an outline of their previous research activities (mainly realized during 
their tenure at INRA) and of their future projects. Promotion committees, 
composed of researchers from INRA and other institutes or universities, examine 
applications and make a first selection, on the basis on scientific achievements. 
Selected researchers are then interviewed, ranked and eventually promoted. In 
the dataset, we can observe the whole of an individual’s career at INRA and how 
long individuals stay in the Researcher grade before reaching the Senior 
2 A small number of direct entries at the senior rank are observed and this very recently. This type of career cannot be regarded 
as a promotion at INRA and is not analysed in this study. 
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Researcher rank. In section three, we are interested in testing whether gender 
produces a significant effect on this duration, which is sometimes right-censored.  
 
Among researchers at INRA, we have decided to focus on researchers in biology, 
which is the main discipline at INRA. Our sample contains 583 researchers and in 
order to describe their career paths, we match two administrative data sets. The 
first describes the length of time spent in each known rank. The second data set 
gives us access to the activity report that each researcher supplies for his or her 
annual evaluation. These data are collected from the time the researcher begins to 
work at INRA to the time of their promotion to the SR position or to the end of 
2002, if they are still in the researcher rank at this time. It must be noted that most 
of the observed researchers have begun their career at INRA: they do not have 
prior experience. 
We observe several cohorts of researchers. A dummy variable, COH1 (being hired 
at INRA before 1980), is created to capture potential cohorts effects, as in Ransom 
and Megdal (1993). These effects could reflect changes in the promotion process. 
Indeed, as in the French academic sector as a whole, recent recruitments and 
promotions seem to be more competitive than in the early eighties.  
We also have information on several individual attributes. For example, we know 
if researchers have graduated from a Top University (TOP_UNIV). These 
universities, the "Grandes Ecoles", are considered, in France, as attracting the best 
students. We also know whether a researcher can act as a PhD. Supervisor (HDR). 
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In France, a particular diploma, the "HDR"3, is required to be able to supervise 
PhDs and our data indicates whether a researcher has this diploma. These two 
variables, TOP_UNIV and HDR, then could act as signal of a higher human 
capital and play a role in the promotion process. 
Our data also contain information on the researchers' mobility. This mobility 
could result from a postdoctoral fellowship (POSTDOC) or a visiting 
professorship or sabbatical abroad, after being hired at INRA (MOB). Mobility is 
often viewed as an opportunity for acquiring new competencies and for 
networking. Developed networks through the scientific community provide 
higher opportunities for collaborations and could increase scientific 
achievements. Mobility could then boost promotions. 
In contrast to other data sets used in the literature, our sample contains 
information on all aspects of the researchers' work. We know each research's 
publication record and, in order to complement this information, we add a third 
data set provided by the Science Citation Index (SCI) which gives us, for each 
publication, its impact factor (according to the journal index quality)4. Using these 
two variables, we construct a publishing score (articles published weighted by the 
journal quality), reflecting publishing productivity (PUB_SCORE). Following Mc 
Dowell et al. (2001), this mixed indicator is preferred to a simple quantitative 
measure of publications, which ignores the visibility or reputation of the scientific 
work. In addition there is information on the degree of implication in scientific 
projects (as participant, NPROJECT, or coordinator, NPROJ_C) and in 
3 "HDR" diploma or "Habilitation" consists in writing a document which outlines the contribution to science. As the PhD., this 
document is defended in front of a jury. 
4 It must be noted that the impact factor is complete for all publications from the early 80's, but it could be more imprecise for 
earlier publications. This must then be taken into account in the econometric results and comments. 
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administrative activities. These activities comprise managing a research team or a 
department (BOSS) or networking activities such as professional affiliations 
(NETW) or being involved in strategic committees, recruitment or promotions 
committees (COMMIT). All these attributes then allow us to have more precise 
information on scientific achievements and their visibility, which are a main pillar 
of the promotion criteria.  
The richness of our data set may have a negative counterpart: scientific 
achievements might be endogenous. For example, the most highly motivated 
researchers could be the ones who have the most important activities and who are 
the most likely to be promoted. This type of mechanism probably underlies the 
career process. But, to be identified, such a process needs valid instruments. 
Unfortunately, our dataset is not informative enough to allow us to test both 
determinants of scientific achievements and those of duration to promotion.  
Furthermore, our administrative data set does not gather information on personal 
characteristics, such as marital status and number of children or on research 
departments' activities. However, previous studies have found these variables to 
have a significant effect on the promotion process. Neglecting these attributes 
could generate an omitted variable bias and this point will be discussed in the 
next section. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the overall sample and on sub-samples 
based on gender or/and rank. Among the 583 individuals in the sample, 37.4% are 
female and 32.4% are Senior Researchers. However, only 5.7% of women are in 
senior positions. These figures are very close to the general situation at INRA (i.e. 
for all disciplines): women are under-represented in the highest rank. Table 2 also 
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shows that there are large differences in the average researcher's profile according 
to gender and rank. First, large differences exist between individuals who have 
been promoted to the SR rank (column SR) and those still in R rank. 17.4% of 
senior researchers are women (20 percentage points less than the number of 
women in the sample). Those promoted have been recruited earlier at INRA, on 
average, in 1976 (instead 1985 in the full sample). They also have lower 
publishing scores, and are more involved in administrative activities. Women 
tend to have been recruited more recently than men at INRA. Females also have 
higher publishing score than male and have fewer administrative activities. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
III- Modelling the determinants of promotion duration
The descriptive evidence clearly indicates that women are under-represented in 
"Senior Researcher" position at INRA. Our aim is to test whether this gender 
differential remains after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Instead of estimating the probability of being promoted, we focus attention on the 
hazard rate, denoted ( )ti . This hazard rate can be written as follows: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )tS
tf
tTp
tTdttTtp
ti
)(/
=

+<
= (1) 
where T is the length of time passed in the "Researcher" rank, f(t) is the density 
distribution and S(t) the survival function. 
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Using the model of Mc Dowell et al. (1999),  can be viewed as the probability at 
time t that an individual's productivity exceeds the department productivity 
threshold (probability of being promoted), given that this productivity is lower at 
least until t (probability of being not promoted until t). As both individual 
productivity and the department's norm are latent variables,  denotes the 
probability of becoming senior researcher, given that no promotion occurs before 
t.
Estimating this hazard rate involves the use of duration models (Lancaster, 1990). 
This methodology allows us to take into account that 67.6% of the individuals are 
still in the "Researcher" rank at the sample date, that is more than two thirds of 
observed durations are right-censored. We estimate a parametric model (with an 
accelerated failure-time form) which allows one to control for both observed and 
unobserved explanatory factors. Kaplan-Meier estimates have shown that hazard 
rates are non-monotonic, and therefore a log-normal distribution5 is applied.  
In our parametric specification, the hazard rate, i , is assumed to depend on 
three arguments: a vector of observable characteristics iX , an individual specific 
effect, iv and an error term i	 .
The X vector includes gender, mobility characteristics, publishing score, 
investment in projects and administrative activities. The iv term is added to 
capture individual unobserved heterogeneity. Using panel models, Mc Dowell et 
al. (2001) have pointed out that neglecting unobserved heterogeneity could cause 
endogeneity bias and lead to spurious results. We use administrative files, in 
5 Various specifications for distributions of durations (log-logistic, weibull, …) were tested. The results are not affected by this 
choice. 
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which several attributes are lacking, such as the number of children, the marital 
status or the characteristics of the research departments. As noted earlier, studies 
have found that these variables have significant effects. Omitting these variables 
could then increase the risk of endogeneity bias.  We are able to overcome this 
difficulty by modelling iv term with a gamma distribution ( ( )iv
 ) with unit mean 
and variance .
The survival function, denoted S(t), can then be written as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) i
v
iiii dvvfvtStS
i
= (2) 
with: 
 ( ) ( )[ ]iiii tvtS  ln/ = ,
(3) 
where iXi e
' = , it the promotion duration and  the cumulative distribution 
function for the standard normal distribution, and:                         
 
 ( ) ( )
1


= ki
kv
k
i vek
k
vf i , where 

1
=k
(4) 
From this general specification, three different models are estimated. Model 1 
imposes the restriction that the unobserved heterogeneity terms are zero (=0), 
while model 2 relaxes this assumption. In model 3 we introduce interaction terms 
between gender and the other explanatory variables. This should allow us to 
control for multicollinearity, as proposed by Mc Dowell et al. (2001). For each 
estimated model, robust t-statistics are calculated (White, 1982). The results are 
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presented in Table 3. They reflect the ceteris paribus effects of each covariate on the 
promotion duration. As accelerated failure-time models are estimated, a positive 
significant sign indicates that a given characteristic increases the duration to 
promotion, or equivalently decreases the promotion hazard. 
 
First, let us focus on the importance of correcting for the unobserved 
heterogeneity. Model 2 provides an estimate of the  parameter, which is 
significantly different from zero. This indicates that unobserved factors must be 
taken into account the model. We prefer therefore the model 2 to model 1, since 
neglecting the iv terms would introduce bias into the estimated effects, including 
the gender impact. More precisely, this would lead to a slight overestimate of the 
gender effect.  
[INSERT TABLE 3]
Let us now look in at the effect of gender. As model 2 indicates an "average 
woman", i.e. a female researcher who would have the same characteristics than a 
male, has a longer wait until promotion. This result could be evidence of the glass 
ceiling hypothesis. But, more detailed comments can be made with the estimated 
hazard rate by gender (figure 1). These estimated hazards are evaluated for 
female and male average characteristics. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
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If women have on average lower predicted hazard rates, we observe that this 
general result is not uniform throughout the career. In the first half of the career, 
women have lower predicted hazard rates. But, women have slightly higher rates 
from 180 months onwards. This result is obtained after controlling from observed 
and unobserved factors. It cannot be explained by omitted individual attributes. 
A statistic explanation could be proposed. As females are promoted later than 
males (see below), females who have suitable competencies to be promoted are 
more numerous after 15 years career than male. We thus observe more females at 
risk in this period than males. Finally, the female promotion rate is higher. 
However, higher female hazard rates at the end of the career do not make up for 
the lower rates in the first half. Another point strengthens this conclusion. The 
peak of the female hazard rate occurs later and is lower than the male peak. 
Females are less likely promoted and when they are this tends to happen later. 
Thus, in spite of differences during the career, the existence of a glass ceiling 
could not to be rejected. This fits in with what Kahn (1993), Mc Dowell et al. (1999) 
or Ginther and Hayes (2003) have found for promotions in USA. Despite strong 
differences between the French academic system and those in the US and UK 
ones, female researchers at INRA also face greater difficulties of getting promoted 
than their male counterparts.  
Apart from this general result, model 3 provides evidence of interaction between 
gender and other covariates. This suggests that gender affects both promotion 
duration directly but also indirectly through the effect on explanatory factors of 
promotion. For example, being a female Ph.D. advisor (HDR) or having been 
graduated from a top university (TOP_UNIV) boosts promotion to the "Senior 
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Researcher" rank. The significant impact of these two variables is not surprising. 
Both generally act as a signal of higher competencies. More surprising is that 
these variables do not have a direct effect on promotion duration, that is no effect 
for men, but only a cross effect with the FEM variable. This could indicate that 
human capital accumulation through attending top universities and obtaining the 
"HDR" diploma are better exploited by females or that these signals play a greater 
role in the female promotion process than in the male one. 
In contrast, mobility, captured through postdoctoral fellowships (POSTDOC) and 
mobility after entry at INRA (MOB), seems to produce a complex effect on female 
promotion. These two variables decrease the global promotion duration, which 
could confirm that mobility provides opportunities for networking and then 
accelerates promotions. But, for females, only mobility after the entry at INRA 
plays this role of a booster, whereas postdoctoral fellowships slow down their 
promotion. This finding could be explained in two ways. First, on the basis of 
sociological research on networking (Granovetter, 1973), it is possible that older 
networks become depreciated. This depreciation is, as for any capital, a natural 
process, but could be strengthened if relationships are not sustained. In our 
sample, females could have neglected their former networks, which have become 
inefficient. The second explanation is that postdoctoral fellowships held by female 
could be less in line with their recent research or more dedicated to teaching, as 
highlighted by Schneider (1998). Skills accumulated during this period would 
then not be essential for promotions at INRA, where researchers have no teaching 
duties. However, our data do not allow us to explore more these potential 
explanations in more detail. 
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A third cross effect concerns gender and administrative activities, such as 
managing a research team (BOSS) or coordinating scientific projects (NPROJ_C), 
which slow down the promotion process for females. This finding is a bit 
surprising as administrative responsibilities are viewed at INRA as one of the 
promotion criteria. But, in our data, very few females are involved in this type of 
activity. Besides, these females seem to have more scientific achievements, in 
terms of publications. In contrast, researchers, mainly male, who have invested in 
management activities, have fewer publications. It could be that two strategies for 
promotion coexist: the first based on scientific achievements, publications or 
participating in projects, the second based on administrative responsibilities. In 
our data, the fact is that the choice of one of these two strategies seems to depend 
strongly on gender. Further investigations must be undertaken into the existence 
of this gender specialization  
 
Beyond these interaction effects, our results confirm two of the findings in the 
previous literature. First, there are cohort effects on promotion duration (COH1). 
Promotions for younger cohorts are more difficult, probably because of a more 
competitive context: more researchers could apply for promotions positions, 
promotions are increasingly scarce. But, the cross effect between gender and 
cohort effect produces no significant effect. Unlike in Ramson and Magdal (1993) 
or Mc Dowell et al. (2001), the glass ceiling does not seem to be affected by a 
cohort effect. At INRA, no cracks in the glass ceiling appear. This could be 
explained by the fact that both women and men face the increased competition 
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between researchers at INRA for promotions and gender does not matter in this 
particular framework. 
We also find that publishing scores (PUB_SCORE) increase hazard rates. This 
confirms that publications are a criterion in promotion success. But, the positive 
effect of publications is true only for recent cohorts (COH1*PUB_SCORE). This 
could be explained by the fact that gathering information on publications and on 
their quality is more precise for recent cohorts (see footnote 4). Our cross effect 
allows us then to correct for the possibility that for past cohorts, publications may 
have been measured with error. 
 
IV- Conclusion
In spite of substantial evidence of the existence of a glass ceiling in French 
academia, no study has so far been undertaken to refute this hypothesis. We thus 
propose a first analysis of the promotion of French researchers. As there is no 
dataset available on researchers' careers, we begin by constructing a database 
which allows us to analyse the full career path and research activities of French 
researchers. We then focus attention on biologists' promotion duration to the 
senior rank at the National Institute for Agricultural Research. Using duration 
models, we conclude that females have a significantly lower hazard rate, in 
particular in the first half of their career, compared to their male counterparts. 
This result is obtained after controlling for both observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, we find that gender does not have any uniform effect 
on promotion, but interacts with other covariates. This suggests that there exist 
accelerator and "slowing-down" factors for female promotion. Finally, our 
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analysis does not refute the hypothesis that a glass ceiling limits the promotion of 
women at INRA.  
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Table 1: Proportion of researchers in senior rank positions
Men Women 
INRA 51% 15% 
Universities 43% 18% 
Public research institutes 45% 25% 
Source: Livre Blanc, 2002 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Full sample Senior
Researchers
Female
Researchers
Male
Researchers
Female Senior
Researchers
Male Senior
Researchers
FEM: being female 37.4% 17.4% - - - -
TOP_UNIV: graduated from a top university 25.6% 45% 14.6% 33.3% 17.7% 47.4%
HDR: having the PhD. Advisor diploma 11.1% 16.4% 4.3% 45.4% 12.4% 10.3%
POSTDOC: having been a postdoctoral fellowship 14.2% 6.3% 19.5% 16.7% 3.0% 7.0%
MOB: mobility since entry at INRA 19.4% 20.6% 17.8% 19.6% 12.1% 22.4%
PROM: being promoted to senior position 32.4% - - - - -
COH1: hired before 1980 28.7% 64.6% 5.4% 16.7% 42.4% 69.3%
PUB_SCORE: publication productivity 20.36 15.1 17.2 32.0 27.4 11.5
NPROJECT: number of projects 1.2 1.5 0.9 2.2 1.3 1.3
NPROJ_C: number of projects coordinated 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.6
NETW: having networking activities 10.5% 18.5% 4.9% 24.2% 8.1% 17.3%
BOSS: managing team or laboratory 12.7% 33.9% 2.2% 24.2% 2.9% 35.9%
COMMIT: participating to strategic committees 4.6% 9.5% 1.1% 9.1% 3.3% 9.6%
Observations 583 189 185 209 33 156
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Table 3: The determinants of promotion duration
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Explanatory factors Coeff. t-ratios Coeff. t-ratios Coeff. t-ratios
Constant 5.48 9.29*** 5.21 8.20*** 5.17 4.26***
FEM: being female 0.20 2.54** 0.16 2.42** 0.09 0.72 ns
COH1: hired before 1980 -0.24 -3.08*** -0.28 -4.19*** -0.27 -3.78***
TOP_UNIV: graduated from a top university 0.02 0.07 ns 0.01 0.02 ns 0.06 1.01 ns
HDR: having the PhD. Advisor diploma -0.21 -2.48*** -0.08 -1.13 ns 0.09 1.02 ns
POSTDOC: having been a postdoctoral fellowship -0.01 -0.08 ns -0.06 -0.66 ns -0.23 -2.35**
MOB: mobility since entry at INRA -0.03 -2.17** -0.02 -2.13** -0.01 -2.22**
NPROJECT: number of projects -1.21 -2.08** -0.81 -1.80* -2.44 -1.78*
NPROJ_C: number of projects coordinated -8.78 -4.25*** -6.38 -3.51*** -4.24 -1.92*
PUB_SCORE: publication productivity -0.06 -0.53 ns -0.16 -1.74* -0.19 -1.75*
BOSS: managing team or laboratory -0.36 -5.07*** -0.18 -2.89*** -0.19 -3.06***
NETW: having networking activities -0.10 -1.29 ns -0.07 -1.00 ns -0.07 -1.04 ns
COMMIT: participating to strategic committees -0.01 -0.10 ns -0.01 -0.15 ns -0.01 -0.27 ns
COH1*PUB_SCORE 1.07 2.03** 0.98 2.76*** 1.14 2.71***
FEM*COH1 -0.20 -1.16 ns
FEM*TOP_UNIV -0.35 -2.74***
FEM*HDR -0.46 -2.99***
FEM*POSTDOC 0.71 2.87***
FEM*MOB -0.07 -2.01**
FEM*NPROJECT -0.89 -2.07**
FEM*NPROJ_C 2.02 2.02**
FEM*PUB_SCORE 0.23 0.87 ns
FEM*BOSS 0.39 2.07**
FEM*NETW -0.15 -0.80 ns
FEM*COMMIT 0.17 1.26 ns
Sigma 0.29 16.88*** 0.17 9.86*** 0.15 9.90***
Theta - - 1.50 4.20*** 1.69 4.72***
Log-Likelihood -250.76 -232.52 -218.89
Observations 583 583 583
NB:  Estimated coefficients are rounded to two decimal places. Robust t-ratios (using heteroscedastic-consistent 
errors from White's (1982) procedure) are reported. 
with: ***:  statically significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level and ns: non 
significant 
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Figure 1: Predicted hazard rates by gender (model 2)
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DO FEMALE RESEARCHERS FACE A GLASS CEILING IN FRANCE?
A HAZARD MODEL OF PROMOTIONS 
First draft 
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Abstract: 
The present article examines whether French female researchers face a glass ceiling, an invisible 
barrier to promotion. Using an original database from the National Institute for Agricultural Research, 
we estimate duration models for promotions. The methodology used allowed us to take into account 
censored observations and unobserved heterogeneity. Our results show a significant gender effect that 
does not contradict the glass-ceiling hypothesis. In addition, factors that boost promotion seem to be 
radically different according to gender and we present evidence that promotion strategies are 
different for males and females. 
 
Keywords: Promotion, Glass Ceiling, Gender Gap 
Code JEL: J16, C41 
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I- Introduction
Whatever the profession (Altonji & Blank, 1999, for an overview and Albrecht, et 
al., 2003; Joy, 1998; Spurr & Sueyoshi, 1994, for studies of specific jobs), the 
literature provides a large amount of evidence for gender-related differences in 
earnings and promotion. Focusing on promotion, females seem to be under-
represented in senior positions, suggesting that women face a glass ceiling that 
limits their promotion. This glass ceiling is a result of gender discrimination, 
which, like other forms of discrimination, is socially unacceptable. However, the 
glass-ceiling phenomenon may also generate negative incentives for women 
(because they are less likely to be promoted, they could, quite rationally, invest 
less in their work), depriving the economy of competencies that could be used 
more efficiently. These social and economic costs have provided a driving factor 
for research into the existence and effects of a glass ceiling.  
In academia, the question of whether or not a glass ceiling exists is all the more 
interesting because this sector is attracting increasing numbers of women; 
therefore, negative incentives may generate higher costs than in other sectors. 
Nevertheless, Benjamin (1999) notes that academia does not seem to have escaped 
the glass-ceiling phenomenon. The ETAN Report (2000) states that, in all OECD 
countries, the proportion of females decreases further up the rank ladder. On 
average, there are three times as many women in “assistant” positions (30.5% are 
women) and twice as many women in "lecturer" positions (20.5% are women) 
than in "full professor" positions (10.4%).  
These statistics seem to be consistent with the presence of a glass ceiling but 
observed gender differences among academics could be caused by gender 
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disparities in the different areas of academia. For example, Schneider (1998) notes 
that a greater proportion of women are involved in teaching activities, which 
could explain why women tend to publish less and why they are less likely to be 
promoted.   
In order to establish the existence of a glass ceiling in academia, other factors that 
affect careers must be taken into account. Econometric analyses are thus required 
in order to obtain ceteris paribus evaluations of the situation facing women.  
However, microeconometric studies are relatively scarce and most of them have 
focused on wages. Studies carried out using Mincer equations generally find 
significant wage gaps between men and women, even after controlling for 
individual characteristics, publication scores and department characteristics, etc. 
Using American data from the Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR), Ginther and 
Hayes (1999) calculated the gender gap in Human Sciences to be 9% in favour of 
men. According to Ward (2001), women in Scottish academia earn 26% less than 
their male counterparts. Although these studies do not refute the glass-ceiling 
hypothesis, they show that the phenomenon may not be clear-cut. First, the 
gender wage gap has decreased since the 1970's (Ransom & Megdal, 1993).  
Second, estimated wage gaps are mainly caused by gender differences in 
observable heterogeneity. For example, by applying an Oaxaca decomposition, 
Ward (2001) showed that only three percentage points of the estimated 26% 
difference in wages can be attributed to discrimination. Ginther and Hayes (2003) 
confirmed this result and demonstrated that gender wage gaps are mostly due to 
gender rank differentials. This suggests that wages are directly related to rank. 
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More recently, research has focused on the promotion process. Ginther and Hayes 
(2003) estimated promotion probabilities using univariate probit models. They 
concluded that women in the Human Sciences are significantly less likely to be 
promoted to tenured positions, ceteris paribus: the estimated gap is about 8%. 
Similarly, Mixon and Trevino (2005) reported discrimination against female 
economists in the US South. Applying the Oaxaca decomposition to a logit model 
of promotion, they found that the promotion probability is 12.2 percentage points 
lower for females and that 7.6 of these 12.2 points cannot be explained by 
differences in productivity and are therefore due to discrimination.  
The glass ceiling can still be seen when the dynamic process of promotion is taken 
into account. Using a random-effects probit model, Mc Dowell et al. (1999) 
concluded that the "average woman" is 36% less likely to be promoted to the 
"assistant professor" rank and 9% less likely to be promoted to the "full professor" 
rank. Similarly, Kahn (1993) found that the risk ratio for female economists 
obtaining tenure is about two-thirds of the male ratio. Ginther and Hayes (2003) 
found similar results in the Humanities, where the estimated gender gap in 
promotion rates is large: women are 25% less likely to be promoted, ceteris paribus.
The empirical literature does not refute the hypothesis that women are less likely 
to gain access to senior positions, which suggests that a glass ceiling does exist for 
academics, whatever discipline they are in. However, existing results are based 
on data from America or the United Kingdom, countries that have very similar 
academic systems, and it could be argued that gender gaps result from certain 
characteristics of these systems that are unfair to females. Therefore, it would be 
Page 29 of 54
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
5
interesting to test the glass-ceiling hypothesis in another type of academic system. 
In this respect, the French system provides an interesting alternative, as French 
academia has a number of specific features that set it apart from the American or 
British systems (see Ginther (2001) and Euwals & Ward (2000) for detailed 
descriptions of these two academic systems).  
Firstly, in contrast to other countries, the French academic sector has two 
branches: universities and national research laboratories. Each branch is 
independent and has its own working rules. For example, researchers working in 
the national research institutes have no teaching duties, unlike those working in 
universities.  
Secondly, in the USA or the United Kingdom, academic careers are dominated by 
tenure rules. After completing a Ph.D., a young researcher is hired as an assistant 
professor on a fixed term contract. Tenured status (as a Full Professor) is not 
awarded until later in an academic’s career and this status is not offered to all 
academics. Promotion criteria include scientific achievements, such as the number 
of papers published and their quality. French academia is organised quite 
differently. A key difference that applies to all French institutions (universities 
and national research laboratories) and all disciplines is that lifetime contracts are 
awarded soon after hiring. Recruitment is based on the quality of the research 
carried out during the Ph.D., but researchers become tenured civil servants after 
only 12 months’ probation and this occurs almost automatically. Civil servant 
status implies a life-long job and, for a given rank, a fixed wage scale. There are 
two main and equivalent ranks in French academia: assistant professor and full 
professor in the university system and researcher and senior researcher in the 
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national research laboratories. Salaries for each rank and status are fixed by a 
national collective agreement and are the same for all universities and research 
laboratories. Academics at the same level in the hierarchy all receive the same 
salary.  
In France, the objective of seeking promotion is not to get tenure (since this is 
automatic) but to earn a higher salary and to obtain greater responsibilities (such 
as being a Ph.D. supervisor or managing a team of researchers). As in other 
countries, promotion to the senior rank depends on scientific achievements, 
which are evaluated by promotion committees.  
Another difference is that all disciplines in French academia are organized 
according to this general framework and they all follow the same general hiring 
and career rules. As stressed in the stylized facts, an examination of the 
promotion process reveals large differences between the genders. This suggests 
that, despite the differences between the French and American/British academic 
sectors, French female researchers are also under-represented in the senior ranks 
and, therefore, a glass ceiling exists.  
 
The aim of this article is to test whether a study of promotion paths supports this 
hypothesis. As in the literature, we will take into account both observed 
heterogeneity, such as individual attributes and scientific achievements, which 
can explain promotion gaps, and unobserved heterogeneity, which are often 
neglected. As career paths in French academia can only be described by changes 
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in rank, the gender effect is evaluated according to the probability of becoming a 
senior researcher. 
In order to carry out this research, we had to overcome a major obstacle: there is 
no generally available data set on academic careers in France. In section two, we 
explain how we constructed a panel data set for researchers' careers. This data set 
allowed us to examine the career paths of a group of biologists working at the 
National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA), one of France’s national 
research institutes. By focusing on life scientists at a single institute we were able 
produce homogenous data that could be used to test the glass-ceiling hypothesis, 
thereby providing the first study of this phenomenon in France.  
 
II- The Data
As there is no official dataset describing the career paths of researchers in France, 
we constructed one, using information from the administrative files of INRA. 
INRA was founded in 1946 to develop scientific knowledge in the fields of 
agriculture, food and the environment. In terms of publications in these fields, 
INRA ranked is second in the world. In 2002, INRA had 260 research departments 
and employed about 1,800 researchers, 37% of whom were female. As in other 
national research institutes, INRA’s researchers are divided into two ranks: 
researchers and senior researchers. In 2002, 35% of INRA’s researchers held the 
senior researcher rank. 
Also like other national research institutes, there is almost gender parity amongst 
researchers but women are under-represented amongst senior researchers: only 
5.5% of researchers are female senior researchers. Furthermore, the situation for 
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female researchers at INRA is worse than at other public research institutes or 
universities. Table 1 shows that the proportion of senior researchers among 
women is ten percentage points lower at INRA than at other public institutes. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
Most of the scientists recruited by INRA are hired as researchers, with promotion 
to the senior researcher rank, if justified, being awarded later in their careers1.
Our research focused on this particular promotion path. Promotion to the senior 
researcher rank mainly occurs through a formal, internal, competitive process 
that begins with the publication of available positions on INRA's website or in 
journals. In order to apply, applicants must fulfil certain eligibility criteria, 
including possession of a Ph.D. and at least eight experience years (at INRA or 
another research institution). Applicants must submit their CV together with 
outlines of their previous research activities (mostly carried out while at INRA) 
and of their future projects. Applications are examined by promotion committees 
composed of researchers from INRA and other institutes or universities, who 
draw up a short list of the most suitable, eligible candidates. These short-listed 
candidates are then interviewed, ranked and eventually promoted.  
This description of the promotion process at INRA highlights the fact that 
applications for senior posts are mostly endogenous. Researchers’ decisions to 
apply for senior researcher posts are usually based on seniority, the quality of 
their scientific work and the number of positions available. The probability of 
applying must therefore be examined. Unfortunately, our administrative dataset 
 
1 In recent years, a small number of scientists have been recruited directly as senior researchers. As this type of career path does 
not constitute promotion within INRA it was not analysed in this study.
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only provides information about promotion decisions and not about applications. 
Furthermore, no details are provided about decisions concerning the eligibility of 
applicants or the number of positions available. In order to minimize bias, the 
empirical part of our study focused on researchers who have sufficient experience 
to be promoted. Nevertheless, the potential endogeneity bias could not be fully 
controlled in our study and our results must therefore be interpreted with 
caution.  
 
Despite this limitation, the dataset allowed us to observe individuals’ entire 
careers at INRA and the length of time people stay at the researcher rank before 
being promoted to senior researcher. Section three of the present article 
investigates whether gender has a significant effect on this duration, which is 
sometimes right-censored.  
Of the researchers at INRA, we decided to focus on the 583 researchers in biology, 
INRA’s main discipline. In order to describe their career paths, we combined two 
administrative data sets. The first lists the length of time spent in each rank; the 
second contains the activity reports each researcher supplies for his or her annual 
evaluation. These data are collected from the time a researcher begins work at 
INRA until the date that person is promoted to a senior researcher position, or to 
the end of 2002, if he or she is still at the researcher grade at this time. From the 
583 researchers observed, we selected individuals for further study on the basis of 
two criteria: they had to have had more than eight years’ experience at INRA and 
they had to have been recruited during a year in which both male and female 
researchers were recruited. These two criteria allowed us to focus on researchers 
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who fulfilled the eligibility criteria for promotion and to compare cohorts 
containing both male and female subjects. Our final sample contained 357 
researchers. 
These 357 researchers were then divided into a number of cohorts. Following the 
example of Ransom and Megdal (1993), we created a dummy variable, COH1 
(hired by INRA before 1980), in order to capture cohort effects, which could, for 
instance, be produced by changes in the promotion process. In fact, in recent 
years recruitment and promotion procedures in the French academic sector as a 
whole seem to have become more competitive than they were in the early 
eighties.  
We also had information about several individual attributes. For example, we 
know which researchers graduated from the "Grandes Ecoles", France’s top 
universities (TOP_UNIV), which are considered to attract the best students. We 
also know if a researcher can supervise Ph.D. students, a role for which a specific 
diploma (HDR2) is required. These two variables, TOP_UNIV and HDR are likely 
to indicate a higher human capital and play a role in the promotion process. 
Our data also contain information on a researcher’s mobility. This mobility could 
be due to undertaking a postdoctoral fellowship (POSTDOC), a visiting 
professorship, or a sabbatical abroad after being hired at INRA (MOB). Mobility is 
often viewed as an opportunity for acquiring new competencies and for 
networking. Networks built up within the scientific community provide greater 
 
2 In order to obtain an "HDR" diploma, also known as a "Habilitation", a candidate must prepare a written document outlining 
his or her contribution to science. As for a Ph.D., this document must then be defended in front of a jury. 
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opportunities for cooperation and can increase scientific achievement; therefore 
mobility can increase the chances of promotion. 
In contrast to other data sets described in the literature, our sample contained 
information on all aspects of a researcher’s work, including each researcher's 
publication record. These publication records were combined with data from the 
Science Citation Index, which provides an impact factor (based on the journal 
quality index)3 for each publication, in order to construct a publishing score 
(articles published weighted by journal quality) that reflects publishing 
productivity (PUB_SCORE). Like McDowell et al. (2001), we preferred this mixed 
indicator to a simple quantitative measure of publications, which does not take 
into account the impact or reputation of the scientific work. In addition, we also 
had information about each researcher’s degree of involvement in scientific 
projects (as a participant, NPROJECT, or a coordinator, NPROJ_C) and in 
administrative activities. These activities include managing a research team or a 
department (BOSS), or networking activities, such as belonging to a professional 
body (NETW) or membership of strategic, recruitment or promotion committees 
(COMMIT). All these attributes provided us with more detailed information on a 
researcher’s scientific achievements and reputation, which are pillars of the 
promotion criteria.  
However, the richness of our data set may have a negative counterpart: scientific 
work might be endogenous. For example, the most highly motivated researchers 
could be the ones who do the most research and contribute most to the literature, 
 
3 The impact factor is complete for all publications from the early 1980's onwards, but it may be more imprecise for earlier 
publications. This must then be taken into account in the econometric results and comments. We therefore introduced a cross 
variable between COH1 and PUB_SCORE, in order to treat the potential collinearity. 
Page 36 of 54
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
12
and who are the most likely to be promoted. But, valid instruments are needed to 
identify these processes. Unfortunately, our dataset is not informative enough to 
allow us to test both the determinants of scientific achievement and those of 
length of service before promotion.  
In addition, our administrative data set does not provide information on personal 
characteristics, such as marital status and number of children, or on the activities 
of each research department. Previous studies have found these variables have a 
significant effect on the promotion process; therefore, neglecting them could 
generate an omitted-variable bias. This point will be discussed in the following 
section. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the whole sample and for sub-samples 
determined according to gender and/or grade. Among the 327 individuals in the 
sample, 35.6% were female and 40.9% were senior researchers. However, only 
19.2% of women held senior positions. These figures are very similar to the 
general situation at INRA (i.e. for all disciplines): women are under-represented 
in the highest ranks. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
For some staff promotion duration (defined in months) is right-censored; 
however, the median time taken to achieve promotion is 136 months, with the 
median time for males being 8 months less than the median time for females. In 
order to take into account censored observations, we estimated simple Kaplan 
Meier survival rates on yearly intervals. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
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Non-parametric hazard rates highlight the fact that, throughout a person’s career, 
the hazard rate for females is always lower than the hazard rate for males: the 
cumulative hazard rate is about 77% for males but only 49.2% for females.   
However, this difference could be caused by gender differences in other variables 
that affect promotion (see Table 2). First, large differences exist between 
individuals who have been promoted to the senior researcher rank and those still 
at the researcher rank. In general, staff promoted to the senior researcher rank 
joined INRA at an earlier date: 64.4% were hired before 1980 (only 32% in the full 
sample). More surprisingly, senior researchers had lower publishing scores (at the 
hiring date) and were more involved in administrative activities. Second, female 
senior researchers had specific characteristics. In general, they had been hired 
more recently than male senior researchers, they had higher publishing scores 
than the males and they carried out fewer administrative activities.  
As the general profiles of senior researchers and of female staff were very 
different, it was necessary to carry out an econometric analysis of the dataset in 
order to evaluate the gender gap in promotion rates at INRA. 
 
III - Modelling the determinants of promotion duration
The descriptive evidence clearly indicates that women are under-represented in 
senior researcher positions at INRA. Our aim was to test whether this gender 
differential remains after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Instead of estimating the probability of being promoted (as in Mixon & Trevino, 
2005), we focused on the hazard rate, denoted ( )ti . This allowed us to take into 
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account both the dynamic dimension of the promotion process and potential 
unobserved heterogeneity terms, which can bias estimations. This hazard rate can 
be expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )tS
tf
tTp
tTdttTtpti
)(/ =
+<= (1) 
where T is the length of time (in months) spent at the researcher grade, f(t) is the 
density distribution and S(t) the survival function. 
Using the model of Mc Dowell et al. (1999),  can be viewed as the probability at 
time t that an individual's productivity exceeds the department productivity 
threshold (probability of being promoted), given that this productivity is lower 
than the threshold at least until t (probability of being not promoted until t). As 
both individual productivity and the productivity norm for the department are 
latent variables,  denotes the probability of becoming a senior researcher, given 
that no promotion occurs before t.
Estimations of this hazard rate were performed using duration models (Lancaster, 
1990), which allowed us to take into account the fact that 67.6% of the individuals 
studied were still at the researcher grade at the sampling date; that is to say, more 
than two thirds of the observed durations were right-censored. We estimated a 
parametric model (with an accelerated failure-time form) that allowed us to 
control for both observed and unobserved explanatory factors. Kaplan-Meier 
estimates have shown that hazard rates are non-monotonic, and therefore a log-
logistic distribution4 was applied.  
 
4 Various specifications for distributions of durations (log-normal, weibull, etc) were tested. The results were not affected by the 
specifications chosen. 
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In our parametric specification, the hazard rate, i , was assumed to depend on 
three factors: a vector of observable characteristics iX , an individual specific 
effect, iv and an error term i	 .
The X vector included gender, mobility characteristics, publishing score, 
investment in projects and administrative activities. The iv term was added to 
capture individual unobserved heterogeneity. Using panel models, Mc Dowell et 
al. (2001) pointed out that neglecting unobserved heterogeneity could cause 
endogeneity bias and lead to spurious results. Several attributes, such as number 
of children, marital status and the characteristics of the research department, were 
missing from the administrative dataset used for our study. As noted earlier, 
studies have shown that these variables have significant effects; therefore, their 
omission increases the risk of endogeneity bias.  We were able to overcome this 
difficulty by modelling iv , a term with a gamma distribution ( ( )iv
 ), unit mean 
and variance .
The survival function, denoted S(t), can then be written as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) i
v
iiii dvvfvtStS
i
= (2) 
with: 
 ( ) ( )[ ]iiii tvtS  ln/ = ,
(3) 
where iXi e ' = , it is the promotion duration and  is the cumulative 
distribution function for the standard normal distribution, and:                        
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 ( ) ( ) 1
= kikv
k
i vek
kvf i , where 
1=k (3) 
From this general specification, three different models were estimated. Model 1 
estimated the effect of gender on promotion duration for the whole sample, 
including both the observed and the unobserved heterogeneity. Models 2 and 3 
gave results by gender in order to test whether or not the effects of explanatory 
variables on promotion duration are gender dependent. 
 
For each estimated model, robust t-statistics were calculated (White, 1982). The 
results are presented in Table 4. They reflect the ceteris paribus effects of each 
covariate on the promotion duration. Time ratios are also given. A time ratio 
lower (higher) than one indicates that the characteristic decreases (increases) 
promotion duration. Time ratios provide interesting information because, as well 
as giving the sign of the effect of a variable, they enable its quantitative effect to 
be evaluated by indicating how much the promotion duration increases or 
decreases for a given explanatory variable. For example, if the time ratio of a 
covariate X is 1.21, the promotion duration for researchers with the X attribute 
will be 1.21 times higher than the duration for researchers lacking this 
caracteristic, ceteris paribus.
Model 1 shows the importance of correcting for unobserved heterogeneity, in that 
it provides an estimate of the  parameter, which is significantly different from 
zero. Thus the model must take into account unobserved factors, as neglecting the 
iv terms would introduce bias into the estimated effects, including the impact of 
gender.  
Page 41 of 54
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
17
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
Model 1 also allows us to examine the effect of gender. The model shows that an 
"average woman", i.e. a female researcher with the same characteristics as a male 
researcher, has to wait longer for promotion. Promotion durations for females are 
1.12 times longer than for their male counterparts. Gender is one of the variables 
with the highest effect on promotion duration. 
This result supports the glass-ceiling hypothesis; however, a more detailed 
picture can be revealed by examining estimated hazard rates by gender (Figure 
2). These estimated hazard rates were evaluated for female and male average 
characteristics. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
Although women had lower predicted hazard rates, on average, than men, we 
observed that this overall result does not apply throughout women’s careers. In 
the first half of their careers, women had lower predicted hazard rates but, after 
180 months, their hazard rates were slightly higher. This result was obtained after 
controlling for observed and unobserved factors. It cannot be explained by 
omitted individual attributes; however, a statistical explanation is possible. As 
females are promoted later than males (see below), after 15 years employment 
females with the competencies needed for promotion are more numerous than 
males. Thus, at this stage in their careers, we observe more females at risk than 
males. Finally, the promotion rate for females is higher than that for men. 
However, the higher hazard rates for females in the second half of their careers do 
not compensate for the lower hazard rates in the first half. This conclusion is 
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strengthened by the fact that the female hazard rate peaks later and at a lower 
value than the male hazard rate. Females are less likely to be promoted and when 
they are promoted it tends to be later in their careers. Hence, although there are 
differences in the career patterns of female and male researchers, a glass ceiling 
still seems to exist. This is consistent with the findings on promotions in the USA 
reported by Kahn (1993), Mc Dowell et al. (1999), and Ginther and Hayes (2003). 
Although there are major differences between the French academic system and 
the American and British systems, female researchers at INRA still find it more 
difficult to gain promotion than their male counterparts.  
As well as gender, promotion durations also seem to be affected by recruitment 
date. Our results show that older cohorts were promoted more quickly than more 
recent cohorts. For example, the promotion duration for personnel recruited 
before 1980 was 0.89 times that of more recent cohorts. This could be due to a less 
competitive recruitment environment before 1980, to a greater availability of 
promotions, and/or to fewer researchers being eligible for promotion. Among 
scientific achievements, which are the main criteria for promotion, the most 
influential variable is BOSS. Managing a team reduces promotion durations by a 
factor of 0.81. Developing and coordinating projects also shorten promotion 
durations, but the publication score (PUB_SCORE) has no significant effect. 
Hence, it seems that the promotion criteria do not all have the same effect on 
promotion duration and that investing in managerial activities is more profitable 
than carrying out research in terms of achieving promotion. 
Models 2 and 3 provide evidence of interaction between gender and other 
variables, suggesting that gender affects promotion duration both directly and 
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indirectly through its effect on the explanatory factors of promotion. A different 
career path can be identified for each gender. For females, promotion is 
accelerated by higher scientific production in terms of publication score 
(PUB_SCORE) or projects (NPROJECT), whereas for males promotion is 
accelerated by managerial achievements (managing a research team (BOSS) or 
coordinating projects (NPROJ_C)). This result indicates the coexistence of two 
strategies for promotion: the first based on scientific achievements, publications 
or participation in projects, the second based on managerial responsibilities. Our 
data suggests that the choice of strategy depends strongly on gender. Further 
work is needed to confirm the existence of such gender-based specialization.  
Estimates of promotion duration by gender highlight that unobserved 
heterogeneity only affect the promotion duration of females (see model 3). This 
could be explained by the fact that our dataset does not included attributes such 
as marital status, number of children and career interruptions due to motherhood. 
Recent studies have shown that these factors do affect women’s careers.  
Our promotion duration models allowed us to make a number of predictions and 
simulations. 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
The results of model 1 were used to estimate the median promotion durations for 
males and females. When censored observations, and unobserved and observed 
covariates were taken into account, we found that females have to wait about 2.75 
years longer for promotion than males. However, simulations carried out with 
female attributes evaluated equally to male attributes (using maleˆ ), and inversely, 
with male attributes evaluated equally to female attributes (using models 2 and 
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3), gave longer promotion durations than those predicted by model 1. However, 
the gender gap in these simulated promotion durations was still less than one 
year in favour of men. In fact, in the hypothetical case of male attributes being 
evaluated equally to female attributes, the simulated promotion duration for 
males would be 2.8 years longer than the predicted duration. For females, the 
simulated promotion duration was only 1 year longer. This result seems to show 
that promotion duration is not only affected by gender differences in the 
covariates but also by the way these covariates are evaluated. 
 
IV- Conclusion
Although there is substantial evidence for a glass ceiling in French academia, no 
previous attempts had been made to prove or disprove its existence. Therefore, 
the present study is the first to investigate whether the promotion durations of 
French researchers are dependent on gender. As there was no available dataset on 
researchers' careers, we began by constructing a database that would allow us to 
analyse complete career paths and research activities of French researchers. 
Focusing on biologists at the National Institute for Agricultural Research, we 
examined promotion durations for elevation to the senior researcher rank. Our 
duration models show that females have significantly lower hazard rates, in 
particular in the first half of their careers, than their male counterparts. This result 
was obtained after controlling for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. 
We also found that the explanatory factors for promotion durations are very 
different for the two genders. This seems to suggest a sort of gender 
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specialisation, with greater scientific achievements providing the fastest route to 
promotion for female researchers and greater managerial responsibilities being 
the best way of ensuring promotion for male researchers.  
Our analysis does not refute the hypothesis that the promotion of women at 
INRA is limited by a glass ceiling; however, further research is needed to 
investigate the effects of the differences in the promotion strategies adopted by 
male and female researchers.    
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Table 1: Proportion of researchers in senior positions
Men Women 
INRA 51% 15% 
Universities 43% 18% 
Public research institutes 45% 25% 
Source: Livre Blanc, 2002 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Full sample Females Senior
Researchers
Female
Researchers
Male
Researchers
Female Senior
Researchers
Male Senior
Researchers
PROM: being promoted to senior position 40.9% 22.0%
FEM: being female 35.6% 19.2%
COH1: hired before 1980 31.9% 12.6% 64.4% 4.0% 14.3% 42.9% 69.5%
HDR: having the Ph.D. supervisor diploma 14.3% 15.7% 17.1% 6.1% 17.9% 50.0% 9.3%
TOP_UNIV: graduated from a top university 27.7% 18.9% 45.2% 17.2% 14.3% 25.0% 50.0%
POSTDOC: having held a postdoctoral fellowship 10.4% 14.2% 3.4% 17.2% 13.4% 3.6% 3.4%
MOB: mobility since entry at INRA 17.4% 13.4% 18.5% 14.1% 18.8% 10.7% 20.3%
PUB_SCORE: publication productivity 22.66 23.62 15.65 19.93 34.22 36.67 10.66
NPROJECT: number of projects 1.39 1.35 1.51 1.08 1.52 2.32 1.31
NPROJ_C: number of projects coordinated 0.53 0.45 0.64 0.35 0.54 0.79 0.60
BOSS: managing team or laboratory 15.1% 7.1% 30.8% 3.0% 5.4% 21.4% 33.1%
COMMIT: participating in strategic committees 62.5% 69.3% 58.9% 67.7% 62.5% 75.0% 55.1%
NETW: having networking activities 13.4% 8.7% 17.8% 6.1% 14.3% 17.9% 17.8%
Number of observations 327 127 146 99 112 28 118
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier hazard rates
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Table 3: The determinants of promotion duration
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Full sample Male Female Explanatory factors
Time 
ratios t-ratios
Time 
ratios t-ratios
Time 
ratios t-ratios 
Constant 1.02 2.01** 0.99 1.04 ns 1.01 0.73 ns 
FEM: being female 1.12 2.67*** - - - -
COH1: hired before 1980 0.89 -3.11*** 0.71 -3.96*** 0.95 -3.01***
TOP_UNIV: graduated from a top university 0.93 -1.87* 0.92 -2.15* 0.98 -1.65 ns
HDR: having the Ph.D. supervisor diploma 0.90 -2.12** 0.98 -1.21 ns 0.92 -2.28** 
POSTDOC: having held a postdoctoral fellowship 1.01 -1.18 ns 1.02 0.97 ns 0.96 -2.19** 
MOB: mobility since entry at INRA 0.95 -2.09** 0.94 -2.08** 0.98 -1.14 ns
NPROJECT: number of projects 0.87 -2.12** 0.88 -1.93* 0.95 -1.98** 
NPROJ_C: number of projects coordinated 0.84 -3.73*** 0.76 -3.82*** 0.98 -1.54 ns
PUB_SCORE: publication productivity  0.97 -1.53 ns 0.99 -1.54 ns 0.56 -2.31***
BOSS: managing team or laboratory 0.81 -6.26*** 0.63 -4.02*** 1.01 1.06 ns 
NETW: having networking activities 0.97 -1.42 ns 0.98 -1.07 ns 0.96 -1.38 ns
COMMIT: participating to strategic committees 0.98 -0.61 ns 0.97 -1.04 ns 1.03 0.97 ns 
COH1*PUB_SCORE 1.07 2.15** 0.94 2.61*** 1.04 1.13*** 
Sigma 0.31 17.04*** 0.23 7.41*** 0.18 5.59***
Theta 1.53 3.88*** 1.18 4.33*** 1.79 4.06***
Log-Likelihood -223.52 -218.91 -201.65 
Observations 327 230 127 
NB:  Estimated coefficients have been rounded to two decimal places. Robust t-ratios (using heteroscedastic-
consistent errors from White's (1982) procedure) are reported. 
***:  statistically significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level, ns: not significant 
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Figure 2: Predicted hazard rates by gender (model 1)
0
.00
5
.01
.01
5
Ha
za
rd
fun
cti
on
100 200 300 400
analysis time
fem=0 fem=1
Log-logistic regression
 
Page 53 of 54
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
29
Table 4: Predicted and simulated median promotion durations
Predicted from model 1 Simulated from models 3 and 4* 
male female male female 
Median duration 192.18 225.26 225.04 236.23 
* These simulations were obtained using the mean values of X for females (males) but the estimated coefficients 
for males (females). 
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